Bob jones university rules on dating

08-Nov-2016 19:38 by 5 Comments

Bob jones university rules on dating

The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the University's claim for a refund and to reinstate the IRS's counterclaim. giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures. The school requires its high school students to take Bible-related courses, and begins each class with prayer. Sincere adherents advocating contrary views have ventilated the subject for well over three decades. Only one month after the IRS announced its position in 1970, Congress held its first hearings on this precise issue. In view of its prolonged and acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings of 19. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are Japhethitic. By stipulation, the IRS agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and most of 1970 to reflect the fact that the IRS did not begin enforcing its policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools until November 30, 1970. Nevertheless, the two sections are closely related; both seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations through the grant of tax benefits. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 220-222 (5th ed.1980). [p583] C Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation located in Goldsboro, N. Like Bob Jones University, it was established to conduct an institution or institutions of learning . Articles of Incorporation ¶ 3(a); Complaint ¶ 6, reprinted in App. Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. Failure of Congress to modify the IRS rulings of 19, of which Congress was, by its own studies and by public discourse, constantly reminded, and Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 19 rulings. Equal Educational Opportunity: Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1991 (1970). Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Nonaction by Congress is not often a useful guide, but the nonaction here is significant. there have been no fewer than 13 bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of § 501(c)(3). Cultural or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's command. As a result, the amount of the counterclaim was reduced to $116,190.99. After the Court granted certiorari, the Government filed a motion to dismiss, informing the Court that the Department of the Treasury intended to revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other pertinent rulings and to recognize § 501(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners. Thereafter, the Government informed the Court that it would not revoke the Revenue Rulings, and withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed as moot. The language of the two sections is in most respects identical, and the Commissioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same standards in interpreting those sections. To the extent that § 170 "aids in ascertaining the meaning" of § 501(c)(3), therefore, it is "entitled to great weight," at 613. 35 (1969), and described "charitable" as "a term that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds of years." at 43. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?

We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. § 501(c)(3), On January 12, 1970, a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated as to admissions on the basis of race. From 1971 to May, 1975, the University accepted no applications from unmarried Negroes, 427 U. 160 (1976), prohibiting racial exclusion from private schools, the University revised its policy. After its request for a refund was denied, the University instituted the present action, seeking to recover the it had paid to the IRS. The court accordingly ordered the IRS to pay the University the refund it claimed and rejected the IRS's counterclaim. To be eligible for an exemption under that section, an institution must be "charitable" in the common law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to public policy. The Executive Branch has consistently placed its support behind eradication of racial discrimination. In 1957, President Eisenhower employed military forces to ensure compliance with federal standards in school desegregation programs. It is, of course, not unknown for independent agencies or the Executive Branch to misconstrue the intent of a statute; Congress can and often does correct such misconceptions, if the courts have not done so. The evidence of congressional approval of the policy embodied in Revenue Ruling 71-447 goes well beyond the failure of Congress to act on legislative proposals. It emphasizes that it now allows all races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on the conduct of all students, including its prohibitions of association between men and women of different races, and of interracial marriage. Bob Jones University was founded in Florida in 1927. C., in 1940, and has been incorporated as an eleemosynary institution in South Carolina since 1952. That same year, the Bureau of Internal Revenue expressed a similar view of the charitable deduction section of the estate tax contained in the Revenue Act of 1918, ch.

or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities, which "exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire educational process." at 469. Even more significant is the fact that both Reports focus on this Court's affirmance of at 7-8, and n. These references in congressional Committee Reports on an enactment denying tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private social clubs cannot be read [p602] other than as indicating approval of the standards applied to racially discriminatory private schools by the IRS subsequent to 1970, and specifically of Revenue Ruling 71-447. Surely Congress had no thought of affording such an unthinking, wooden meaning to § 170 and § 501(c)(3) as to provide tax benefits to "educational" organizations that do not serve a public, charitable purpose. In 1894, when the first charitable exemption provision was enacted, racially segregated educational institutions would not have been regarded as against public policy. 664, 673 (1970), we observed: Qualification for tax exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax-exempt groups lose that status when their activities take them outside the classification and new entities can come into being and qualify for exemption. But, unlike the Court, I am convinced that Congress simply has failed to take this action and, as this Court has said over and over again, regardless of our view on the propriety of Congress' failure to legislate, we are not constitutionally empowered to act for it. With undeniable clarity, Congress has explicitly defined the requirements for § 501(c)(3) status. organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; . The first general income tax law was passed by Congress in the form of the Tariff Act of 1894. The income tax portion of the 1894 Act was held unconstitutional by this Court, 158 U. 601 (1895), but a similar exemption appeared in the Tariff Act of 1909 which imposed a tax on corporate income. And again, in the direct predecessor of § 501(c)(3), a tax exemption was provided for any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, [p616] no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. I have little doubt that neither the "Fagin School for Pickpockets" nor a school training students for guerrilla warfare and terrorism in other countries would meet the definitions contained in the regulations. In 1970, the IRS was sued by parents of black public school children seeking to enjoin the IRS from according tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated against blacks. 997 (1971), and in the face of a preliminary injunction, [p620] the IRS changed its position and adopted the view of the plaintiffs. Perhaps recognizing the lack of support in the statute itself, or in its history, for the 1970 IRS change in interpretation, the Court finds that "[t]he actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority," concluding that there is "an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 19 rulings." 381 U. The Court next asserts that "Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it enacted the present § 501(i) of the Code," a provision that "denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy statements [p621] provide for" racial discrimination. Quite to the contrary, it seems to me that, in § 501(i), Congress showed that, when it wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully aware of how to do it. The Court points out that, in proposing his amendment, Congressman Ashbrook stated: "‘My amendment very clearly indicates on its face that all the regulations in existence as of August 22, 1978, would not be touched.'" The Court fails to note that Congressman Ashbrook also said: The IRS has no authority to create public policy. I agree with the Court that Congress has the power to further this policy by denying § 501(c)(3) status to organizations that practice racial discrimination.

Because of this admissions policy, the IRS revoked the University's tax-exempt status. C Petitioners contend that, regardless of whether the IRS properly concluded that racially discriminatory private schools violate public policy, only Congress can alter the scope of § 170 and § 501(c)(3). This contention presents claims not heretofore considered by this Court in precisely this context. The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. The Court found no constitutional infirmity in "excluding [Jehovah's Witness children] from doing there what no other children may do." Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial [p604] impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets. 30, 35 (1958), in which this Court referred to "the presumption against congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy" in upholding the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions claimed by a trucking company for fines it paid for violations of state maximum weight laws. In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools violate fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to confer a benefit on the public, we need not decide whether an organization providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of § 501(c)(3) could nevertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law or public policy. Section 501(c)(3) provides tax-exempt status for: Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. The Court first seeks refuge from the obvious reading of § 501(c)(3) by turning to § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides a tax deduction for contributions made to § 501(c)(3) organizations. For this reason, I would reverse the Court of Appeals.

That court found an "identity for present purposes" between the and we affirm in each. organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . Petitioners argue that the plain language of the statute guarantees them tax-exempt status. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.

II A In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the IRS formalized the policy, first announced in 1970, that § 170 and § 501(c)(3) embrace the common law "charity" concept. They emphasize the absence of any language in the statute expressly requiring all exempt organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense, and they contend that the disjunctive "or" separating the categories in § 501(c)(3) precludes such a reading. 447, Congress expressly reconfirmed this view with respect to the charitable deduction provision: The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. B We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not "charitable" should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy. Congress, in Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.

After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit in Federal District Court, and the IRS counterclaimed for unpaid taxes. (a) An examination of the IRC's framework and the background of congressional purposes reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the IRC, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity -- namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. (b) The IRS's 1970 interpretation of § 501(c)(3) was correct. That court approved the IRS's amended construction of the Tax Code. All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy. It is both a religious and educational institution. These are but a few of numerous Executive Orders over the past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Executive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating racial discrimination. In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new problems. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the courts to implement the legislative will. This in turn may necessitate later determinations of whether given activities so violate public policy that the entities involved cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of "charitable" status. Bull., at 231, is wholly consistent with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had repeatedly declared before 1970. That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. JUSTICE POWELL concedes that, if any national policy is sufficiently fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is the policy against racial discrimination in education. Since that policy is sufficiently clear to warrant JUSTICE POWELL's concession and for him to support our finding of longstanding congressional acquiescence, it should be apparent that his concerns about the Court's opinion are unfounded. In light of our resolution of this litigation, we do not reach that issue.

The District Court entered summary judgment for [p575] the IRS, rejecting Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status under § 501(c) (3) and also its claim that the denial of such status violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Neither petitioner qualifies as a tax-exempt organization under § 501(c)(3). Thus, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that section, and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest, and the institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private educational entities. At the same time, the IRS announced that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions for income tax purposes [under § 170]." By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally notified private schools, including those involved in this litigation, of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in the United States at all levels of education." 404 U. The court also held that racially discriminatory private schools were not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) and that donors were not entitled to deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170. Based on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education," the IRS ruled that a [private] school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code. Its teachers are required to be devout Christians, and all courses at the University are taught according to the Bible. § 7421(a), prohibited the University from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive action before the assessment or collection of any tax. Indeed, as early as 1918, Congress expressly authorized the Commissioner "to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the tax laws. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to do so. Some years before the issuance of the rulings challenged in these cases, the IRS also ruled that contributions to community recreational facilities would not be deductible, and that the facilities themselves would not be entitled to tax-exempt status, unless those facilities were open to all on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. We emphasize, however, that these sensitive determinations should be made only where there is no doubt that the organization's activities violate fundamental public policy. Indeed, it would be anomalous for the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches to reach conclusions that add up to a firm public policy on racial discrimination, and at the same time have the IRS blissfully ignore what all three branches of the Federal Government had declared. The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, [p605] IV The remaining issue is whether the IRS properly applied its policy to these petitioners. The common law requirement of public benefit is universally recognized by commentators on the law of trusts.

Goldsboro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. [p600] Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation. Exhaustive hearings have been held on the issue at various times since then. Not one of these bills has emerged from any committee, although Congress has enacted numerous other amendments to § 501 during this same period, including an amendment to § 501(c)(3) itself. The Government suggested that these actions were therefore moot. The Government continues to assert that the IRS lacked authority to promulgate Revenue Ruling 71-447, and does not defend that aspect of the rulings below. 509, Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39 Law & Contemp. This assertion dissolves when one sees that § 501(c)(3) and § 170 are construed together, as they must be. We need not consider whether Congress intended to incorporate into the Internal Revenue Code any aspects of charitable trust law other than the requirements of public benefit and a valid public purpose. 601 (1895), for reasons unrelated to the charitable exemption provision. A similar exemption has been included in every income tax Act since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, beginning with the Revenue Act of 1913, ch.

On occasion, however, the school has accepted children from racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is Caucasian. 30, 1979; replaced by similar provisions in the Emergency School Aid Act of 1978, Pub. Before this Court ruled on that motion, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enjoined the Government from granting § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis of race. The predecessor of § 170 originally was enacted in 1917, as part of the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 330, whereas the predecessor of 501(c)(3) dates back to the income tax law of 1894, Act of Aug. The dissent acknowledges that the two sections are "mirror" provisions; surely there can be no doubt that the Court properly looks to § 170 to determine the meaning of § 501(c)(3). The draftsmen of the 1894 income tax law, which included the first charitable exemption provision, relied heavily on English concepts of taxation, and the list of exempt organizations appears to have been patterned upon English income tax statutes. The terms of that exemption were, in substance, included in the corporate income tax contained in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch.

Under that view, to qualify for a tax exemption pursuant to § 501(c)(3), an institution must show, first, that it falls within one of the eight categories expressly set forth in that section, and second, that its activity is not contrary to settled public policy. Instead, they argue that, if an institution falls within one or more of [p586] the specified categories it is automatically entitled to exemption, without regard to whether it also qualifies as "charitable." The Court of Appeals rejected that contention and concluded that petitioners' interpretation of the statute "tears section 501(c)(3) from its roots." 639 F.2d at 151. , taken by themselves, and literally construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff. In 1924, this Court restated the common understanding of the charitable exemption provision: Evidently, the exemption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is intended to aid them when not conducted for private gain. But there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice. Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education.

It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute: The general words used in the clause . But this mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal -- because it is evident that, in many cases, it would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. Prior to 1954, public education in many places still was conducted under the pall of [p593] 347 U. An unbroken line of cases following establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals. is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.

This "charitable" concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the Code.